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FROM THE SUBLIME TO THE ORDINARY: STANLEY 
CAVELL’S BECKETT 
 
‘Beckett shrugs his shoulders at the possibility of philosophy today.’ So 
claims Theodor Adorno in his rather abortive ‘Versuch, das Endspiel zu 
verstehen.’1 And yet, perhaps because of this very act of shoulder shrugging, the 
works of Samuel Beckett seem to have fired the imaginations of a great many 
philosophers. Discussions of Beckett feature prominently in the writings of such 
thinkers as Gilles Deleuze, Maurice Blanchot, Alain Badiou, and, of course, 
Theodor Adorno, and current work in Beckett studies has been dominated by 
contemplating, clarifying, and extrapolating these philosophical readings.2 A 
recent book by Richard Lane, entitled Beckett and Philosophy, is divided into a 
section mapping out Beckett’s significance for an array of French philosophers, 
and another section mapping out the same territory in German philosophy.3 
Tellingly, there is no third section on Beckett’s significance for Anglo-American 
philosophers, despite the fact that his works have drawn comment from leading 
thinkers like Martha Nussbaum and Stanley Cavell.4 Indeed, since the 
publication of Must We Mean What We Say? forty years ago, Cavell’s essay on 
Endgame has attracted the attention of only the smallest handful of 
commentators – a fraction of those who have written on Adorno’s essay on the 
same subject. My aim in this paper will be to take some steps towards redressing 
this imbalance, by teasing out some of the implications of Cavell’s position. 
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I 
 
I want to start by taking a few caveats from Simon Critchley, one of the 
select few philosophers to have taken Cavell’s reading of Beckett seriously. 
Critchley begins his philosophical discussion of Beckett with the following 
words of warning: 
 
The writings of Samuel Beckett seem to be particularly, perhaps 
uniquely, resistant to philosophical interpretation. … [H]is texts 
continually seem to pull the rug from under the feet of the 
philosopher by showing themselves to be conscious of the possibility 
of such interpretations; or, better, such interpretations seem to lag 
behind the text which they are trying to interpret; or, better still, such 
interpretations seem to lag behind their object by saying too much: 
something essential to Beckett’s language is lost by overshooting the 
text and ascending into the stratosphere of metalanguage. … [I]t 
might well be that philosophically meditated meanings are precisely 
what we should not be in search of when thinking through Beckett’s 
work.5  
 
Critchley characterises the danger besetting those of us who try to read Beckett 
philosophically as ‘saying too much and saying too little, saying too little by 
saying too much’ (Critchley, p. 144). This is a warning we would do well to heed 
– a satisfactory approach to Beckett, it seems, must navigate between a Scylla 
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and a Charybdis: on the one hand, the temptation to conclude that Beckett’s 
works are essentially meaningless; and on the other, the compulsion to read into 
them layers and levels of supposedly ‘deeper’, pseudo-philosophical, 
metaphysical meaning. It is between these two extremes – distant cousins, I 
suspect, of skepticism and metaphysics – that Cavell’s reading of Beckett tries to 
plot its course, while acknowledging both the temptation and the compulsion that 
would lead it astray. 
 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Cavell’s reading of Beckett is its 
insistence on taking Beckett as literally as possible.6 Cavell steers deftly between 
the argument that Beckett’s plays are meaningless and the argument that they 
have a supposedly ‘deeper’ metaphysical meaning by pointing out that, as often 
as not, Beckett’s characters mean exactly what they say. Endgame is suffused 
with a property that Cavell terms ‘hidden literality’ (MWM, p. 119) – as in: 
HAMM: Did you ever think of one thing? 
CLOV: Never. 
or: 
CLOV: Do you believe in the life to come? 
HAMM: Mine was always that.7 
This is what Cavell calls ‘Beckett’s uncovering of the literal’ (MWM, p. 120), 
and it is directly related to the claims he makes about the ordinariness of 
Endgame. As Cavell puts it: ‘the sort of method I try to use consistently in 
reading the play, [is] one in which I am always asking of a line either: What are 
the most ordinary circumstances under which such a line would be uttered? Or: 
What do the words literally say?’ (MWM, p. 121). This strategy might reasonably 
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be expected to stave off the threat of skepticism, but I find it does rather the 
opposite. Faced with an assertion like: ‘Beckett’s plays mean nothing more and 
nothing less than what they say’, a skeptic (or, for that matter, a bemused 
undergraduate) might reasonably respond with the question ‘And what is that?’ 
A meaningful answer to this question could well prove difficult to give. 
 
How, then, are we to read Endgame? All too often, critics and 
philosophers spill rivers of hermeneutic ink in seeking to persuade themselves 
and others that they have uncovered a meaning to a literary text that is more than 
is said by the words at first sight. This exposes their widely held, problematic 
suppositions that our words can or could mean more than they say, opening up a 
metaphysical dimension for meaning, in which proliferate unresolvable 
arguments about which supposedly ‘deeper’ meaning the text is supposedly 
‘really’ about. It goes against more or less the entire bent of Cavell’s thought to 
do this – particularly when the text under discussion is as enigmatic as Beckett’s 
Endgame. Yet critics of Cavell have pointed out that this is precisely what he 
does in his own reading: in his essay, Hamm and Clov’s shelter becomes Noah’s 
ark; the play takes on the force of a theological parable on eschatology; and its 
eschatological dimensions evoke the spectre of nuclear holocaust (see MWM, pp. 
132-55). For Jay Bernstein at least, Cavell’s reading of Beckett fails to practice 
what it preaches.8 But this isn’t the problem it seems at first blush. These 
excursive flights into exegesis surely exemplify the crux of Cavell’s case: that 
there is a deep-seated compulsion to see into Beckett’s words something more 
than they say, a need to get from them more than they have given us. As Cavell 
puts it: ‘We have to talk, whether we have something to say or not; and the less 
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we want to say and want to hear the more wilfully we talk and are subjected to 
talk’ (MWM, p. 161). To put it another way, Cavell successfully argues that there 
is no contradiction between Beckett’s lack of faith in words and his going on to 
use them (see MWM, p. 161). By the same token, there is no more contradiction 
in Cavell advocating that we take Endgame literally, and his going on to read it 
allegorically. 
 
In any case, for much of his essay, Cavell argues not that Beckett’s play 
is incapable of meaning something more than it says, but rather the opposite: that 
it is incapable of meaning anything less; that it is incapable of attaining the status 
of meaninglessness ascribed to it by so many critics. As Cavell puts it, ‘The 
discovery of Endgame, both in topic and technique, is not the failure of meaning 
(if that means the lack of meaning) but its total, even totalitarian, success – our 
inability not to mean what we are given to mean’ (MWM, p. 117). It is this claim 
that strikes me as the most interesting aspect of the essay, and one that, along 
with the following assertion, invites further discussion: ‘Solitude, emptiness, 
nothingness, meaninglessness, silence – these are not the givens of Beckett’s 
characters but their goal, their new heroic undertaking’ (MWM, p. 156).  
 
Simon Critchley glosses these claims by relating them to the role of the 
ordinary in Cavell’s thought. That is, Endgame is anchored in what Cavell 
highlights as the ‘ordinariness’ (p. 117) of its events and its language, but that 
does not, in and of itself, stabilise its meaning or make it straightforward. Rather, 
for Critchley, here as elsewhere in Cavell’s thought, ‘the ordinary is the object of 
a quest, a task, something to be achieved and not an available fact’ (Critchley, p. 
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178). According to Critchley, ‘On Cavell’s reading, Beckett is not telling us that 
the universe is meaningless, rather meaninglessness is a task, an achievement, the 
achievement of the ordinary or the everyday’ (p. 179).  
 
Perhaps the obvious question to ask here would be: is this task achieved? 
Is this goal ever reached? Everything about Cavell’s position seems to imply that 
the answer to this question is, and must necessarily be, no. If, as Cavell has it, 
Beckett’s play is indeed imprisoned within the totalitarian confines of 
inescapable meaning, then the possibility of breaking free of these shackles does 
not and cannot arise. To think otherwise would be to lapse into the delusion that 
Beckett’s words could somehow avoid meaning what they say. Moreover, if the 
answer were yes, then Endgame might indeed aspire to the condition of 
meaninglessness, an argument from which Cavell distances himself at the start of 
his essay, describing it as ‘impositions from an impression of fashionable 
philosophy’ (MWM, p. 115). 
 
It may seem perfectly in tune with the spirit and timbre of Beckett’s plays 
to see within them an ongoing task that can never be accomplished, a distant goal 
that can never be achieved. But it is nonetheless a questionable move. Critchley’s 
suggestion may encapsulate the predicament of Hamm and Clov perfectly, and it 
may well describe our experience in watching them, and perhaps that is all it 
needs to do. But, by implication at least, it lines up Beckett alongside the likes of 
Emerson, Thoreau, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell 
himself, for whom to be in quest of the ordinary is to be in quest of the 
unattainable. It seems to me that there is something qualitatively different about 
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what Beckett does that sets him apart from these writers and thinkers. I would 
suggest, pace Critchley, that Beckett’s characters are not so much in quest of the 
ordinary as imprisoned within it, and their impossible task is not so much 
achieving the ordinary but aspiring beyond or beneath it. That this is an 
unattainable quest, an impossible task, is, perhaps, the tragedy of the everyday.9 
 
Ultimately, whichever of these versions of Beckett we prefer, there are 
limits to an approach that takes Beckett too literally, and these are limits that are 
implicit in Cavell’s own discussion. After charting the forms of hidden literality 
found in Endgame, Cavell goes on to diagnose a very different form of meaning 
in the play, in which the words do indeed seem to mean more than what they say. 
It is described as ‘the way an utterance which has entered naturally into the 
dialogue and continues it with obvious sense suddenly sends out an intense 
meaning, and one which seems to summarise or reveal the entire drift of mood or 
state of mind until then unnoticed or unexpressed’ (MWM, p. 128). One of the 
examples Cavell gives of such a ‘climactic exclamation’ (p. 149) is Hamm’s 
enigmatic line ‘To think it won’t all have been for nothing’ (Beckett, p. 108). 
Reflecting on the experience of such lines, Cavell says ‘It would not be quite 
right to say that something was revealed; but there was as it were an air of 
revelation among us’ (MWM, pp. 128-9).  
 
Cavell is undoubtedly right to hear such moments with a sense of 
revelation about them peppered throughout Beckett’s works: indeed, one can 
hardly watch a performance of Endgame without hearing them. But these 
moments might be seen as problematic for an approach that tries to take the play 
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literally: they seem to imply that, at times, Beckett’s words have the capacity to 
reveal something more than what they say, and yet that something is not 
necessarily a meaning that is recuperable within ordinary language. As a 
Wittgensteinian might put it, ‘It is not a something, but not a nothing either!’10 
Are these abortive epiphanies in Beckett’s prose troublesome for an approach 
that takes as its working assumption the premise that his words mean no more 
and no less than what they say? In the next part of my paper, I want to explore 
this question with reference to what James Noggle has called ‘The 
Wittgensteinian Sublime’. 
 
II 
 
Noggle takes one of the most traditional concepts associated with 
aesthetics – that of the sublime – and rethinks it in terms of the Wittgensteinian 
ideas of language games and the limits of language. Such a move might at first 
blush seem uncongenial to the bent of the Philosophical Investigations. After all, 
Wittgenstein warns us against the ‘tendency to sublime the logic of our language’ 
and against the ‘tendency … to purify, to sublime, the signs themselves’ 
(Wittgenstein, §38; §94). But elsewhere he says ‘These considerations bring us 
up to the problem: in what sense is logic something sublime?’ (§89). This is 
indeed a good question to ask of the author of the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus. Noggle suggests that the vast, undiscovered country wovon man 
nicht sprechen kann is best thought of as the territory of the sublime. To use the 
well-known example of Tractatus 6.421: 
It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. 
 9 
Ethics is transcendental. 
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)11 
This is a clear instance of the classic bind of the Tractatus: on the one hand, we 
are aware of a vast, transcendental realm that appears to harbour all the 
metaphysical truths of philosophy; yet, on the other, we are aware that this realm 
remains unattainable, incomprehensible, unspeakable, since, as Wittgenstein has 
just warned us in Tractatus 6.42, ‘Propositions can express nothing that is 
higher’. For Noggle, this bind is closely analogous to the concept of the sublime. 
He argues: 
Our attempts to venture beyond language games … posit a 
supersensible domain of discouse … But as Wittgenstein says, our 
apprehension of this domain is illusory. We attain an illusion of 
transcendence similar to the illusion experienced in the sublime, 
where the saturation of our cognitive or perceptual faculties seems to 
present the infinitely mighty or vast, but in fact can indicate no more 
than our inability to cognise or perceive infinitely.12 
The experience of the sublime, it will be remembered, is not an experience 
with any positive content whatsoever: it is an experience of our incapacity 
to comprehend or to articulate it. Noggle compares it to what Wittgenstein 
calls the ‘bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up 
against the limits of language’.13 This remark in turn suggests how the 
experience of the sublime is, perhaps surprisingly, intimately related to the 
realm of ordinary language. As Noggle argues: 
In [Wittgenstein’s] later work, philosophical utterances ‘sublime the 
logic of our language’ not because they gesture outward toward some 
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ineffable but metaphysically significant realm beyond the ordinary. 
Rather, they are an effect of language’s failure to do so, to hint at 
anything truly metaphysical, truly beyond ordinary language games. 
Much as sublime experience according to Kant’s third Critique offers 
not a true image of absolute power or the infinite universe but rather 
an instance of our failure to grasp such things, language ‘outside 
language games’ is an outward venture that leads us nowhere but 
backward, to the untranscendental conditions of ordinary language – 
which is all there is (“WS”, p. 609). 
Or, to put it more succinctly, ‘Sublime language is a leap away from the ordinary, 
not into some alternative language of metaphor but into the void of meaning’ 
(“WS”, p. 614). And yet, of course, we find ourselves compelled to attempt such 
leaps, in spite of – perhaps even because of – their futility. Like characters in a 
Beckett play, we strain to reach beyond the ordinary, though doing so can only 
result in meaninglessness.14 
 
Noggle compares the experience of the Wittgensteinian sublime with 
Cavell’s emphasis on encountering the limits of language games: ‘For Cavell, 
only by departing from language games can we grasp their significance’ (“WS”, 
p. 607) – which is not to say or imply that there is anything ‘beyond’ or ‘outside’ 
language games that we grasp instead. Such ventures are rather ‘(attempted) 
departures from that from which we “cannot” depart’ (“WS”, p. 613).  
 
To describe the Wittgensteinian sublime in these terms is to recognise 
that it is fundamental to the question of the limits of language and to the 
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meaninglessness that lies beyond everyday language games. Yet it also 
highlights an interesting dialectical relationship that the Wittgensteinian sublime 
mediates between ordinary language games and meaninglessness, in that, for 
Noggle, ‘the sufficiency of language games reveals itself only if we subject 
ourselves to the metaphysical nonsense that would seem to negate them’ (“WS”, 
p. 614). This is a position that is very close indeed to Cavell’s, as is evident in 
this short summary: ‘Ordinary language is both all the language we ever really 
have and radically in need of the extraordinary language of metaphysical illusion 
– which is useful only insofar as it proves from the perspective of ordinary 
language to be useless’ (“WS”, p. 611).  
 
Interestingly, Noggle’s delineation of the Wittgensteinian sublime takes 
inspiration from other aspects of Cavell’s work – in particular, a brief but 
suggestive passage from This New Yet Unapproachable America: 
Wittgenstein’s appearance at this intersection of romanticism and 
skepticism and Kant is, so it seems to me, encoded in his concept of 
subliming. … But whereas in Kant the psychic strain is between 
intellect and sensibility, in Wittgenstein the straining is of language 
against itself, against the commonality of criteria which are its 
conditions, turning it as it were against its origins. – Thus a derivative 
romantic aesthetic problematic concerning the sublime moves to the 
center of the problematic of knowledge, or say wording the world; 
quite as if aesthetics itself claims a new position in the economy of 
philosophy.15 
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Cavell doesn’t specify what this new position might be, but if Noggle is 
right, then the Wittgensteinian sublime might be that which both designates 
and demarcates the boundaries of the knowable, the thinkable, and the 
speakable. To attempt to aspire beyond these, as Hamm and Clov do – as 
from time to time we all do – is to take on the sublime, to try and bring it 
within the compass of language and of comprehension: in short, to try to 
turn it into something like the beautiful. 
 
It is with these terms in mind that I return now to Cavell’s literary 
aesthetic. The attempt, so common in literary texts but by no means peculiar to 
them, to use ordinary language to gesture beyond itself is, for Noggle, ‘best 
identified as a species of the sublime’ (“WS”, p. 605). After all, it has long been 
a critical commonplace that works of literature do their best to depart from the 
conventions of everyday language games, in quest of more striking meanings, 
and clearly the Wittgensteinian sublime gives us an intriguing way of 
conceptualising how they (attempt to) do so. But a sensible objection to my line 
of argument at this stage would be that, if Cavell is right, then generally speaking 
Beckett does not do this. Beckett’s lines, Cavell argues, generally mean what 
they say: they ought to be taken literally, as pieces of ordinary language. A 
similar approach has been argued for in the movement towards a Wittgensteinian 
literary criticism articulated by Marjorie Perloff and others – that Wittgenstein’s 
emphasis on the everyday helps us to appreciate the creativity of writers from the 
modernists to the language poets (and she explicitly includes Samuel Beckett 
amongst them)16 who turned deliberately to ordinary language precisely in order 
to reject poetry’s traditional, romantic attempts to get beyond it. Theirs, Perloff 
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argues, is an aesthetic of the ordinary – what she calls ‘the “ordinary language” 
poetics so central to our time’ (Perloff, p. 22) – and the critic should embrace this 
aesthetic in approaching them. There would not appear to be much room for the 
Wittgensteinian sublime, or indeed for any other kind of sublime, if we adopt this 
critical emphasis on ordinary, everyday, literal language. 
 
To think this way, though, is to set up a false opposition between 
Perloff’s ‘ordinary language poetics’ and Noggle’s Wittgensteinian sublime – 
and to misunderstand Cavell’s approach to Beckett. For it is in the nature of both 
Cavell’s and Noggle’s enterprises that they are neither stable nor sustainable. 
Both demonstrate, as does Perloff, that an emphasis on ordinary language is all-
important. But the ‘ordinary’ is not always straightforwardly or readily available 
in or on its own terms. Indeed, for Cavell, the ordinary is most clearly grasped in 
the moment of its loss. Just as the Wittgensteinian sublime is an empty territory, 
a void of meaninglessness where we cannot dwell, and from which we pass back 
into the realm of the ordinary with a better, more sharply defined sense of its 
power and its limits, so too the everyday language of Beckett’s Hamm and Clov 
is not and cannot be sufficient unto itself, but inevitably bumps up against the 
limits of language, as even the most ‘ordinary’ or ‘everyday’ work of literature 
must. To quote Noggle once again: 
At such extreme moments, in the Investigations’ words, ‘language is 
like an engine idling’, disengaged from the language games in which 
it has its life and therefore alienated from and useless to its user – a 
state of confusion that Wittgenstein also describes as ‘the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language’ 
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(Philosophical Investigations §109). But while such linguistic 
bewitchment or alienation by definition can never be seen as a 
language game in itself, Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein also 
stresses that we can never find a way of avoiding it once and for all, 
that we must confront it repeatedly – and he furthermore persistently 
suggests that literary works are especially good at provoking such 
confrontations (“WS”, p. 606). 
Which is not to suggest that we should risk ‘equating good literature with bad 
philosophizing’ (“WS”, p. 607). It is rather to acknowledge the near inevitability 
of overstepping the limits of language and hence passing into nonsense in a 
literary text, even if – perhaps especially if – that text attempts to confine itself to 
the ordinary. ‘Thus’, Noggle says, ‘the aesthetic power of language outside 
language games does not affect us in spite of its distinctness from ordinary 
concerns but rather consists in it’ (“WS”, p. 612). 
 
III 
 
So much for the philosophy: how then to support this argument with 
reference to Beckett’s Endgame, and Cavell’s reading of it? Starting with Cavell, 
towards the end of his essay on Endgame, Beckett’s use of words in his writing is 
described in these terms: ‘One could say: He doesn’t use them just any way; and 
even: He doesn’t use them at all (for example, to promise, to threaten, to pray, to 
apologise – the things words are used for) or sees how far he can go in not, in not 
saying more than the words’ (MWM, p 161). In a telling choice of phrase, Cavell 
suggests that Beckett is not so much trying to take ordinary language as far as he 
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can go in terms of meaning, but as far as he can go in terms of not meaning 
something more, not going beyond it – as if acknowledging the inevitability of so 
doing, or as if the two were inextricably implicated in one another. A similar 
choice of phrase is in evidence when Cavell tells us that ‘To miss the 
ordinariness of the lives in Endgame is to avoid the extraordinariness (and 
ordinariness) of our own’ (MWM, p. 119). Once again, there is the suggestion 
here that the ordinary and the extraordinary are linked, and that the sense of each 
is gained from passing on into the realm of the other. 
 
But, as we see in Endgame, such a transition is an empty one, in that 
when Hamm and Clov’s words manage to depart from the ordinary, the result is 
a ‘coupling of their sublimity with their nonsensicality’ (“WS”, p. 617). Consider 
this line of Hamm’s, taken from his final monologue: ‘Moments for nothing, now 
as always, time was never and time is over, reckoning closed and story ended’ 
(Beckett, p. 133). The first part of the line – ‘now as always, time was never and 
time is over’ – is a patent self-contradiction, a parcel of nonsense that, however 
poetic it sounds, says nothing intelligible. It is, I think, as clear an evocation of 
the unfathomable and incomprehensible nature of time, and hence of the sublime, 
as William Blake’s rather more traditional exhortation to ‘Hold infinity in the 
palm of your hand / and eternity in an hour’. And yet the second part of Hamm’s 
line – ‘reckoning closed and story ended’ – insists on the limits of knowledge 
and of language, and seems to draw back from the abyssal depths hinted at in the 
first part. Perhaps this is nothing more than what Wittgenstein would have called 
‘The transition from patent nonsense to something which is disguised 
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nonsense’,17 but it nevertheless hints at a transition from the sublime to the 
everyday. 
 
A similar transition can be seen more clearly in the following piece of 
dialogue between Hamm and Clov: 
HAMM: Go and get the oilcan. 
CLOV: What for? 
HAMM: To oil the castors. 
CLOV: I oiled them yesterday. 
HAMM: Yesterday! What does that mean? Yesterday! 
CLOV: [Violently.] That means that bloody awful day, long ago, before this 
bloody awful day. I use the words you taught me. If they don’t mean 
anything any more, teach me others. Or let me be silent. (Beckett, p. 113). 
 
This exchange begins as a perfectly everyday, workmanlike piece of 
conversation. The dialogue about the oilcan and oiling the castors is as ordinary 
as a builder asking his workmate for a slab, or a customer asking the shopkeeper 
for five red apples. But something extraordinary enters the conversation with the 
word ‘yesterday’: Hamm demands ‘Yesterday! What does that mean? 
Yesterday!’. The obvious way to read this line would be as the interjection of a 
hard taskmaster: something like ‘What’s the good of telling me you did it 
yesterday when I want it done today?’. Hamm throws the word ‘yesterday’ back 
at Clov, as if he were scoffing at it. But, of course, given the context of the play, 
it is also a line haunted by the spectre of metaphysics: it is a kind of 
philosophical question – ‘Yesterday! What does that mean? Yesterday!’ It is not 
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so much a question as an evocation of the sublime, the incomprehensible mystery 
of passing time. It broaches the domain of the infinite, and, as a question, it is, of 
course, unanswerable. But Clov refuses to hear either the scoffing or the 
evocation: he insists on answering the question literally by providing Hamm with 
a literal definition of the word ‘yesterday’ as it is ordinarily used: ‘That means 
that bloody awful day, long ago, before this bloody awful day.’ He is, to 
paraphrase Wittgenstein, bringing Hamm’s words back from their metaphysical 
to their everyday uses, and thereby recuperating them from the realm of the 
sublime. Or, as he puts it, ‘I use the words you taught me. If they don’t mean 
anything any more, teach me others.’ Clov’s words here recall Cavell reporting 
Esslin reporting Gessner reporting Beckett’s response to a question about the 
insufficiency of language, to which Beckett replied ‘Que voulez-vous, Monsieur? 
C’est les mots; on n’a rien d’autre’ (see MWM, p. 161). And indeed, what else is 
there? Certainly, there are no more sugar plums, no more bicycle wheels, no 
more pap, no more pain killer. 
 
If I appear to be investing too much significance here in the word 
‘yesterday’, it is because this same word is used to (attempt to) evoke the same 
depths by Hamm’s mother Nell. Consider, once again, the transition between 
ordinary, workmanlike language and the evocative use of that word in the 
following exchanges between Nagg and Nell:  
NAGG: I’ve lost me tooth. 
NELL: When? 
NAGG: I had it yesterday. 
NELL: (Elegiac.) Ah yesterday! 
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[They turn painfully towards each other.] (Beckett, p. 99) 
Or, once again: 
NAGG: Could you give me a scratch before you go? 
NELL: No. [Pause.] Where? 
NAGG: In the back. 
NELL: No. … 
NAGG: … Could you not? [Pause.] Yesterday you scratched me there. 
NELL: [Elegiac] Ah yesterday! (Beckett, p. 101) 
With this one word – ‘yesterday’ – Nell passes beyond what Cavell calls her 
‘girlish re-rhapsodizing the beauties of Lake Como’ (MWM, p. 118) and into an 
abyss of melancholy so deep it cannot be put into words – it can only be hinted at, 
evoked with the word ‘yesterday’ spoken (as the stage direction requires) in an 
elegiac tone of voice. It is as if a whole world of pain is contained in the word – 
and yet that is not how Nagg uses it, nor how Clov defines it, nor how it fits into 
ordinary language. The world of pain that is contained within the word can never 
be given form, shape, or content. 
 
I use this turn of phrase – ‘a world of pain is contained in the word’ – 
because it is how Wittgenstein describes a similar experience. Commenting on 
Schubert’s Death and the Maiden in his Vermischte Bemerkungen, we find the 
following instance of the phenomenon I am describing: 
The last two bars of the ‘Death and the Maiden’ theme … it’s 
possible to understand this first as an ordinary, conventional figure 
before coming to understand its deeper expression. I.e., before 
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coming to understand that what is ordinary here is filled with 
significance. 
‘Fare well!’ 
‘A whole world of pain is contained in these words’. How can 
it be contained in them? – It is bound up with them. The words are 
like an acorn from which an oak tree can grow.18 
 
Here, Wittgenstein’s strategy is the exact opposite of Clov’s: faced with his 
metaphysical expression – the sublime evocation of the whole world of pain that 
lies in just two words – he prefers to delve further into the territory of the 
meaningless than to bring the words back home to the ordinary. (Perhaps this 
makes Wittgenstein more of a romantic than a skeptic here.) He asks the question 
‘How can it be contained in them?’, which sounds as if he is about to correct 
himself, but rather does the opposite, by answering the question with a parable of 
an acorn and an oak tree that is purely figurative, and which, once again, evokes 
much, but means nothing. The gesturing towards an unspeakable sublime is here 
an unrecuperated gesture into meaninglessness. 
 
A final example of what is at stake here is in evidence in one of Cavell’s 
own examples. Consider this short exchange between Hamm and Clov: 
HAMM: I’ll give you nothing more to eat. 
CLOV: Then we’ll die. 
HAMM: I’ll give you just enough to keep you from dying. You’ll be hungry 
all the time. 
CLOV: Then we won’t die. (Beckett, pp. 94-5) 
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According to Cavell, this is a signal instance of when Beckett’s words at first 
blush mean something other than what they say. He argues: 
 
Clov can hardly be meaning what his words, taken together and 
commonly, would suggest, namely ‘It makes no difference to me 
whether I live or die; I couldn’t care less’. First in one sense that is so 
trivial a sentiment, at their stage, that it would get a laugh – at least 
from clear-headed Hamm. Second, it is not true. How could it make 
no difference when the point of the enterprise is to die to that 
world? … And he could care less, because he’s trying to leave 
(MWM, p. 125). 
 
The alternative Cavell suggests is that Beckett’s characters are deaf to 
implicatures: that is, that there is no implicit threat in Hamm’s line ‘I’ll give you 
nothing more to eat’, and that, hence, Clov is simply commenting on the logical 
consequences of Hamm’s decisions. The words mean what they literally say – 
i.e., they mean less than what they would ordinarily imply.19 
 
Whilst this is an interesting way of looking at this dialogue, I would 
suggest that we can both have our cake and eat it here. Clov is also doing 
something else in this extract, whether he or Beckett mean him to or not. He is, 
once again, bringing Hamm’s words back from their metaphysical to their 
everyday uses, taking them from the sublime to the ordinary. To be more precise, 
we can retain the sense of the threat in Hamm’s words – ‘I’ll give you nothing 
more to eat’ – and read Clov as commenting upon it as an ordinary statement. A 
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threat to starve someone to death should evoke a reaction of shock, terror, and 
awe, which emotions would normally betoken the presence of the sublime, but 
Clov’s reaction takes Hamm’s threat away from the metaphysical and back to an 
ordinary, banal statement. Viewed this way, it is both a refusal to be drawn into 
the power that the sublime has to lead us away from the literal, and an 
acknowledgement of that power. In fact, it puts Clov in a position not unlike that 
of the skeptic. 
 
Indeed, Noggle suggests that there is a ‘comparison between sublime 
experience and the alienating and absorbing powers of skepticism’ (“WS”, p. 
612), in that both seem to open up an abyss beneath our feet into which our 
securities are plunged, whilst simultaneously – and perhaps paradoxically – 
appearing inconsequential, since, in both cases, we soon emerge from the abyss 
unscathed. ‘Like Hume’s skepticism’, says Noggle, ‘the sublime aesthetic effect 
is distinguished by its capacity to alternately overturn everything and nothing at 
all, the proximity that it establishes between absolute precariousness and absolute 
security – the aesthetic unification of our terror of the ocean storm with our 
safety on shore’ (“WS”, p. 612). 
 
This relationship between a Cavellian view of skepticism and a 
Wittgensteinian view of the sublime would be an apt way of drawing towards a 
conclusion. Since, for Cavell at least, skepticism is not (and cannot be) overcome 
by further knowledge, or certainty of belief, or insistence on either of these 
things, but only by a reframing of the ground of skepticism itself, so too the 
encounter with the meaninglessness beyond everyday language games that 
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constitutes the Wittgensteinian sublime can be apprehended only by reframing 
the ground of the gesture towards the metaphysical, and returning (albeit 
temporarily) to the ordinary and the everyday. What can we conclude from this 
about Beckett’s Endgame? That Hamm and Clov’s fraught relationship with the 
language they use encapsulates and lays bare the ceaselessly, inevitably shifting 
transition between sense and nonsense that characterises the quest for certain 
forms of meaning. Like the very skepticism to which such a relationship with 
meaning must no doubt give rise, this quest is attainable only by the kind of 
therapeutic intervention that addresses the ongoing compulsion – to which 
readers of Beckett seem particularly addicted – of questing for such meanings in 
the first place. 
 
Perhaps we would be right to take a skeptical view of the Wittgensteinian 
sublime, since, after all, we cannot do anything with it. Yet, at the same time, we 
cannot do without it, either, so skepticism in this case is ‘not irrefutable, but 
obviously nonsensical’.20 Either way, it makes no difference, and it makes all the 
difference in the world. We cannot help but plunge into the abyss of the 
Wittgensteinian sublime in search of so-called ‘deeper’ meanings to our words. 
But there are no more of these than there are sugar plums or pain killers, and it is 
simultaneously the Wittgensteinian sublime which shows us this. This is why 
Cavell is right to describe Beckett’s technique in Endgame as ‘not by supposing 
that there is a way out of language, but by fully accepting the fact that there is 
nowhere else to go’ (MWM, p. 126). And yet I question whether anyone – even 
Beckett, even Hamm and Clov – can ever ‘fully accept’ the limits of language so 
simply, since we are doomed, time and again, to find ourselves propelled from 
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the ordinary to the sublime and back again. That is why the final sentence of 
Cavell’s essay on Beckett is such an apt conclusion: ‘We hang between’ (MWM, 
p. 162).21 
 
NOTES 
 
1.  Theodor Adorno, “Trying to Understand Endgame” in Notes to Literature, 
trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia U.P., 1991), p. 284. 
2. For Deleuze on Beckett, see his “He Stuttered” in Gilles Deleuze and the 
Theatre of Philosophy, eds. Constantin V. Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski, 
trans. Constantin V. Boundas (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 23-9, as well as 
“The Greatest Irish Film (Beckett’s ‘Film’)” and “The Exhausted” in Gilles 
Deleuze: Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. 
Greco (London: Verso, 1998), pp. 152-74; for Blanchot on Beckett, see his 
“Where Now? Who Now?” trans. Richard Howard in Samuel Beckett, ed. J. 
Birkett and K. Ince (London: Longman, 2000), pp. 93-8; for Badiou on Beckett 
see his On Beckett, ed. and trans. Nina Power and Alberto Toscano, (Manchester: 
Clinamen Press, 2003). A good account of these positions is Derval Tubridy’s 
“The Absence of Origin: Beckett and Contemporary French Philosophy” in 
Literature and Philosophy: A Guide to Contemporary Debates ed. David 
Rudrum (London: Palgrave, 2006), pp. 24-36. 
3. See Beckett and Philosophy, ed. Richard Lane (London: Palgrave: 2002). 
4. Stanley Cavell, “Ending the Waiting Game: A Reading of Beckett’s 
Endgame” in Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays (updated ed., 
Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2002), pp. 115-162; hereafter abbreviated MWM. 
 24 
Martha Nussbaum, “Narrative Emotions: Beckett’s Genealogy of Love” in 
Love’s Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1990). 
5. Simon Critchley, “Know Happiness – On Beckett” in Very Little … Almost 
Nothing: Death, Philosophy, Literature (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 141-180; 
p. 141-2. 
6. It is precisely this aspect of Cavell’s approach to which Benjamin Ogden 
objects. He asks, not unreasonably, ‘What does it mean, ultimately, for a line in 
Endgame to be read literally?’ See Benjamin H. Ogden, “What Philosophy Can’t 
Say About Literature: Stanley Cavell and Endgame”, Philosophy and Literature 
33 (2009): pp. 126-138; p. 137. 
7. Samuel Beckett, “Endgame” in his Complete Dramatic Works, (London: Faber, 
1986), pp. 89-134; p. 111, p. 116. 
8. See Jay Bernstein, “Philosophy’s Refuge: Adorno in Beckett” in Philosophers’ 
Poets, ed. David Wood (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 177-191. 
9. It is for this reason that I find the main thrust of Ogden’s critique of Cavell’s 
interpretation unconvincing. Ogden says of Cavell: ‘His work of criticism is in 
search of something that it must find (that is, something that it claims to have 
found even when it may not have); what it must find is a work of literature that 
demonstrates the utility and validity of ordinary language philosophy’ (Ogden, p. 
126). On the contrary, Cavell’s reading of Beckett – and indeed a large 
component of his broader philosophical project – tends rather to problematise 
what the ordinary might mean or might be, in ways not always as congenial to 
mainstream ordinary language philosophy as Ogden makes out. 
10. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd ed., trans. G.E.M. 
Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), §304. 
 25 
11. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and 
B. F. McGuiness, introd. Bertand Russell (London: Routledge, 2001). 
12. James Noggle, “The Wittgensteinian Sublime”, New Literary History 27 
(1996): pp. 605-619; p. 610. Hereafter abbreviated “WS”. 
13. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §119. 
14. This compulsion is, of course, described in much detail in Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations, where it forms one of the principal kinds of 
philosophical ‘illness’ or ‘disease’ that Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach seeks 
to address. In philosophy, we are told, 
it is difficult as it were to keep our heads up, – to see that we must 
stick to the subjects of our every-day thinking, and not go astray and 
imagine that we have to describe extreme subtleties which in turn we 
are after all quite unable to describe with the means at our disposal. 
We feel as if we had to repair a torn spider’s web with our fingers. 
(§106). 
Yet it is no less difficult to escape from the grip of metaphysical ideals once they 
have us in thrall: 
The ideal, as we think of it, is unshakable. You can never get outside 
it; you must always turn back. There is no outside; outside you 
cannot breathe. – Where does this idea come from? It is like a pair of 
glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It 
never occurs to us to take them off. (§103). 
The Wittgensteinian project of philosophy as a form of therapeutic intervention 
would, on the evidence of these quotations, appear at least in part to take its cue 
from the richly problematic interrelation of ordinary, everyday language, and the 
 26 
metaphysical emptiness of  the Wittgensteinian sublime – though that must form 
the subject for a more ambitious paper than this one. 
(Incidentally, it might be of passing and coincidental interest that the 
vocabulary Wittgenstein uses in Investigations §103 is highly reminiscent of 
Hamm and Clov’s, particularly of Hamm’s blindness and Clov’s inability to 
leave their shelter.) 
15. Stanley Cavell, This New Yet Unapproachable America, (Albuquerque: 
Living Batch Press, 1989), p. 54, quoted by Noggle in “The Wittgensteinian 
Sublime”, p. 607. It is worth pointing out that the idea of the sublime and its 
relation to Wittgenstein’s thought crops up throughout This New Yet 
Unapproachable America. On the very first page, Cavell asserts ‘I specify as 
philosophical work what Wittgenstein means by “leading words home”, back 
from the sublime into our poverty’ (p. 1), and elsewhere admires Wittgenstein’s 
‘relentless project to, perhaps we can say, de-sublimize thought’ (p. 71). More 
importantly, in an argument that closely anticipates Noggle’s, he implicitly 
opposes the ‘ordinary’ with what he calls ‘this frozen emptiness of sublimity’ (p. 
56). 
16. See Marjorie Perloff “Witt-Watt: The Language of Resistance/The 
Resistance of Language” in Wittgenstein’s Ladder: Poetic Language and the 
Strangeness of the Ordinary (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 
115-143. 
17. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §524. 
18. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, ed. G. H. von Wright, trans. Peter 
Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 52e. 
 27 
19. Stanley Cavell has pointed out to me that for this reason, the cited passage 
neatly demonstrates that the literal can not be equated with the ordinary or the 
everyday: the ordinary and the literal meanings are divergent here. By the same 
token, we should avoid equating the literary with the metaphysical, or with some 
other ‘extra-ordinary’ term. 
20. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 6.51. 
21. Thanks to Stanley Cavell, Marjorie Perloff, James Conant, Paola Marrati, 
James Noggle, Anselm Haverkamp, Christoph Menke, Katrin Trüstedt, Hent de 
Vries, Asja Szafraniec, Christopher Johnson. 
 
